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The Party of Regions monopolises power in Ukraine
Tadeusz A. Olszański
Since the Party of Regions took power in Ukraine, the process of strengthening 
the executive branch of government at the expense of the  others, together with 
the instrumental use of the law, has been progressing steadily. By seeking to 
restrict criticism of the government, the ruling party is aiming at marginalisa-
tion of opposition groups and establishing informal control over the main media 
(largely by exerting pressure on their owners). The role of the Security Service 
of Ukraine (SBU) is growing, as it is used increasingly frequently to put pres-
sure on Western-oriented NGOs. The government’s control over the judiciary 
is expanding. These trends had existed before the Party of Regions’ ascension 
to power, but they were much weaker, as the previous governments did not 
enjoy such a strong position or the ability to achieve their ends so efficiently. 
The Party of Regions is planning to take another step towards total power du-
ring the local elections scheduled for October 2010. The party is determined to 
establish control over the local self-governments; to this end, it has amended 
the legislation in a way which now undermines local civil initiatives.
These changes not only illustrate the interests and political standpoint of 
the ruling elite; they also result from systemic reasons, and these are deeply 
rooted in the Soviet past. The present Ukrainian state has evolved through 
the evolutionary transformation of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. 
As a result, the main features of the previous system have been sustained, 
including the weakness of the representative bodies and the instrumental 
use of the law. Twenty years into its independent development, Ukraine has 
developed a merely formal democracy, which is distant from EU standards.
Post-Soviet Ukrainian democracy
Since its victory in the presidential election and its defeat of Yulia Tymoshenko’s govern-
ment, the Party of Regions has sought to monopolise power. The new government has 
a much stronger position and greater potential for action than the previous ones. The presi-
dent’s office and the cabinet of ministers are now in the hands of the Party of Regions, as is 
a firm majority in parliament. However, in its attempts to strengthen its influence, the party 
has not limited itself to measures that are in line with contemporary democratic standards; 
some of its decisions are highly dubious, or openly inconsistent with the democratic princi-
ples. These actions are aimed at two goals: restricting political pluralism, and strengthening 
the executive’s control over other institutions of the state and civil society.
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This trend is nothing new in Ukrainian political life: former governments and presidents 
acted likewise. What is new is the determination and the pace of actions which the Party of 
Regions’ leadership, the President Victor Yanukovych and Mykola Azarov’s government have 
taken. This determination is supported by the extent of the party’s electoral success, which 
gives it much greater freedom of action compared to any of its political predecessors. 
This trend should not be surprising, as it is deeply rooted in the mechanisms of Ukrainian 
democracy. These have developed in an evolutionary manner, through reforms of the in-
stitutions of the Soviet system with their apparent (and deliberately simulated) democratic 
nature, the superficial nature of representative organs, and the instrumental use of the law. 
Thus, the current structures of the government, state administration, local self-government 
and many of the social institutions (including labour unions), are in fact transformed ver-
sions of Soviet institutions. They have retained both an institutional continuity (including 
their so-called organisational culture) and, to a large extent, their personal continuity. Like-
wise, the political culture of both the elites and the general public is a transformed version 
of the Soviet political culture.
Ukraine has succeeded in creating an efficiently functioning formal (electoral) democra-
cy, wherein authority is transferred according to election results that are accepted by the 
international community as being fair (there was only one attempt at overt falsification of 
the elections, in 2004, and the subsequent massive social protest forced the authorities 
to withdraw). Another feature of Ukrainian democracy is that the executive and legislative 
branches of the government are in formal balance (especially since the strengthening of the 
parliament at the expense of the president in 2004).
Thus, Ukrainian democracy complies with only a minimum of the standards imposed on 
democratic states in the Western world. It lacks a modern party system, wherein parties 
express the main ideological and political options of society. In reality, Ukraine’s largest par-
ties represent big business (oligarchic) groups, and smaller parties are often simply owned 
by businessmen with political ambitions. The judiciary has failed to become the ‘third 
estate’ that could co-participate in the democratic balance of government. Neither have 
influential and genuinely independent media and non-governmental organisations emer-
ged. Ukraine also lacks local self-government in the form it exists in Europe: despite some 
positive changes, a post-Soviet model of a ‘nomenklatura self-government’ still prevails, 
and is now one of the Ukrainian state’s most corrupt structures. Finally, despite some pro-
mising announcements from the new government, corruption is not considered something 
reprehensible, but as one of the mechanisms that regulate relations between the state and 
the citizen, especially businessmen, while 
the corruption rent remains an important 
source of income for officials.
The constitution of Ukraine claims that it is 
a ‘state governed by the rule of law’, which Ukra-
ine has in fact failed to become. The European 
notion of law and order is simply alien to the 
Ukrainian political elites, regardless of their po-
litical option. Instead, there remains the Soviet 
understanding of the law as one of the instru-
ments of political power, which encourages 
the instrumental use of legal norms and, which 
is much worse, an instrumental approach to 
the process of lawmaking. This kind of approach to the law is probably the greatest impediment to the 
development of democratic institutions in Ukraine. Other impediments are the very low quality of the legi-
slation (including the constitution), as well as the weakness and deep-rooted corruption of the courts.
Ukrainian democracy complies with only 
a minimum of the standards imposed on 
democratic states in the Western world. 
It lacks a modern party system. The judi-
ciary has failed to become the 'third estate'. 
Neither have influential and genuinely 
independent media and non-governmental 
organisations emerged. Ukraine also 
lacks local self-government in the form 
it exists in Europe.
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Another important element of the Ukrainian political system is the public’s lack of faith 
in the parliament and, in a more general sense, in the institutions and procedures of repre-
sentative democracy as such.
Dangerous new trends
Seeking to dominate the party scene
The Party of Regions is aiming to replace the previous system where the oligarchic elite 
bargains over its economic and political interests through political parties and the parlia-
ment, by a mechanism where this process would take place within the party elite or in the 
government it controls. To be able to do this, the Party of Regions seeks to ensure its per-
manent domination of the party scene by creating conditions in which the remaining parties 
will have to choose between becoming ‘satellites’ or suffering marginalisation. The status 
of ‘satellites’ has already been accepted by the Communist Party of Ukraine, the Lytvyn 
Bloc and the deputy PM Serhiy Tihipko’s Strong Ukraine. The marginalised parties include 
those groups that once made up President Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine and other right-wing 
parties. The pressure which the Party of Regions and state authorities is exerting on the 
Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc is probably calculated to split the party and marginalise most of its 
factions, including Tymoshenko herself.
The competition among political parties, 
which once dominated Ukrainian politics, 
is gradually being replaced by the compe-
tition between the informal factions within 
the Party of Regions. The key factions 
in the party include the following: the ‘Ros- 
UkrEnergo faction’, representing the inte-
rests of the state bureaucracy and those 
businessmen who opt for closer relations 
with Russia (it is lead by the head of the Presidential Administration, Serhiy Lovochkin; the 
head of the Security Service of Ukraine and a media magnate, Valeriy Khoroshkovsky; and the 
businessman Dmytro Firtash) and the ‘Donetsk faction’ that represents those entrepreneurs 
who are more export-oriented (they sell their products on global markets) and are therefore 
more open to closer relations with the West (its leaders are the billionaire Rinat Akhmetov 
and the deputy PMs Boris Kolesnikov and Andriy Kluyev). None of these factions is internally 
homogeneous; the rivalry between the different interest groups in each one is lively. Currently, 
the RosUkrEnergo faction holds an advantage over the Donetsk one, although it cannot be 
ruled out that the latter will win more influence for itself in the future.
Control over the parliament and judiciary
Following its victory in the presidential election, the Party of Regions formed a new majority 
in the parliament, extending the pro-government coalition with the support of dozens of de-
puties from opposition factions. This was made possible due to a disputable interpretation 
of the constitution (which was nevertheless endorsed by the Constitutional Court1), and also 
by pressuring or/and corrupting opposition deputies to make them join the coalition without 
changing their faction.
After that, the Party of Regions carried out some reshuffles that gave it control over the 
chief authorities of the judiciary (the Supreme Council of Justice, the Supreme Court, and 
the High Administrative Court of Ukraine) and the Constitutional Court. Formally, these 
changes were compatible with the law2, but their aim was undoubtedly to subordinate these 
bodies to the executive authority and to ensure legal decisions that would be favourable to 
OSW.WAW.PL
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 This appropriate provision of the 
constitution is rather imprecise. 
It can be interpreted in two 
ways; either that a parliamen-
tary coalition can be composed 
of factions of deputies, or by 
individual deputies themselves. 
In 2007, the Constitutional 
Court ruled that the former 
interpretation was correct, while 
in 2010 it pointed to the latter. 
In each case, the interpretation 
was favourable to the respective 
presidents (Yushchenko and 
Yanukovych); it can be assumed 
that in both cases the rulings 
were made under political pres-
sure. 
2 However, the dismissal of three 
judges from the Constitutional 
Court in September may arouse 
suspicion that there might have 
been pressure from above.
The Party of Regions is aiming to replace 
the previous system where the oligarchic 
elite bargains over its economic and poli-
tical interests through political parties and 
the parliament, by a mechanism where 
this process would take place within the 
party elite or in the government it controls.
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the executive. This was particularly significant in case of the Constitutional Court, the only 
state body that has the authority to interpret the constitution.
The law on the judiciary system and the status of judges which was passed in May has si-
gnificantly limited the powers of the Supreme Court and expanded the authority of president 
over the judiciary sphere. The latter amendment clearly violates the law, as the president’s 
authority is defined by the constitution and cannot be altered by any other legal act.
The executive balances on the boundaries of the law
The government and president avoid infringing the law openly, but they treat it in a pu-
rely instrumental manner. The president has started issuing formal orders to the Prime 
Minister and heads of other state bodies, even though the constitution does not give him 
the authority to do so. The executive bodies’ self-confidence (not to say arrogance) is gro-
wing visibly. The powers of the State Tax Administration have been extended again, and 
can be used to intimidate businessmen so 
that they do not support any media and 
organisations that criticise the policies 
of the government and local authorities. 
Widely publicised investigations concer-
ning cases of corruption are now much 
more numerous than during Victor Yush-
chenko’s presidency, and often seem to be 
politically motivated, regardless of the fact 
that the allegations are usually justified.
A new phenomenon is the increasing role 
of the Security Service of Ukraine, undo-
ubtedly with the Presidential Administration’s consent. Previously, even under Leonid Kuch-
ma’s presidency, it was almost unthinkable that a representative of the Adenauer Founda-
tion would be detained at a Ukrainian airport, representatives of the Soros Foundation and 
the rector of the Catholic University in Lviv would be invited for a ‘warning talk’, and that 
historic documents would be ostentatiously confiscated from the Lviv Museum to Victims of 
the Totalitarian Regimes3. The common goal behind these actions seems to be to intimidate 
NGOs and civil society communities who are critically disposed towards the current autho-
rities and at the same time linked to Western organisations. There have been no reports of 
similar actions taken towards NGOs supported by Russian organisations.
The law enforcement bodies have initiated a series of criminal proceedings against high-
ranking state officials who have been suspected of ‘white-collar crimes’. One such case was 
the takeover of gas stockpiles belonging to the RosUkrEnergo company, which is co-owned 
by Dmytro Firtash of the Party of Regions (the gas was taken over by the Tymoshenko go-
vernment; RosUkrEnergo filed a lawsuit to the Stockholm Arbitration Tribunal and won the 
case). During this case, Tymoshenko’s closest aide Oleksandr Turchynov, a former deputy 
PM, was interrogated several times as a witness. No such proceedings have been initiated 
against high-ranking officials working under then-PM Yanukovych, although there is eviden-
ce that they had been breaking the law. The actions which the law enforcement bodies are 
currently taking may thus be qualified as harassment of the major opposition party4.
There is suspicion that the government is trying to fuel internal disputes in the Yulia Tymo-
shenko Bloc, and even to inspire splits in the regional organisations of Batkivshchyna, the 
Bloc’s main party. It cannot be currently identified to what extent the splits in the party have 
been caused by external inspiration, or even corruption, and to what extent they are a result of 
a natural decomposition process following the electoral defeat. However, one part of this pro-
blem is the legislation that grants the government excessive authority over political parties5.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 This is a result of a peculiar 
legal situation: this museum, 
like others of this kind, 
is an organisational unit of 
the Security Service of Ukraine.
 
 
 
 
4 Ukraine's Prosecutor's Office 
is a structure with hierarchical 
subordination (prosecutors have 
no independence), and the 
Public Prosecutor General 
has a practically unlimited 
ability to interfere in ongoing 
proceedings.
5 For example, the local bodies 
responsible for internal affairs 
issue seals to the local units 
of political parties.
The government and president avoid infrin-
ging the law openly, but they treat it 
in a purely instrumental manner. The pre-
sident has started issuing formal orders to 
the Prime Minister and heads of other state 
bodies, even though the constitution 
does not give him the authority to do so. 
The executive bodies' self-confidence 
(not to say arrogance) is growing visibly.
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Finally, the government’s stance towards politically-oriented assemblies has grown visibly 
stricter. During opposition rallies and pickets, the militia have been acting much more firm-
ly, and the administrative bodies have started to enforce the regulations of the law on public 
assemblies, which were originally passed in the Soviet period.
New threats to the media
The fact that the Security Service of Ukraine is headed by Valeriy Khoroshkovsky, the owner 
of Ukraine’s largest media company Inter, seems unacceptable from the democratic perspec-
tive (although it must be added that Khoroshkovsky was first nominated as the deputy head 
of the SBU by Victor Yushchenko in March 2009). There is no doubt that Khoroshkovsky 
will use his office for his own business interests, as well as in the interest of his political 
party. Weaker media owned by minor businessmen (who in most cases are linked to current 
opposition) may fall victim to this policy. The first manifestation of this trend was when two 
TV stations which strongly opposed the government’s policy – 5 Kanal and TVi – had part 
of their frequency band removed6.
Most of the Ukrainian national media are sensitive to suggestions made by the governmen-
t’s representatives, as these media companies’ owners are big businessmen who operate 
in different branches of the economy; they therefore try to keep good relations with the political 
authorities. These owners are inclined to respect and even anticipate the government’s sugge-
stions regarding media information policy. 
Despite numerous accusations, there has 
been insufficient official evidence that 
the state authorities have put pressure 
on the media, although it seems highly 
likely that this pressure has been exerted, 
as some TV channels have visibly softe-
ned their criticism of the government.
On the other hand, it must be said that 
Ukrainian journalists tend to ascribe the 
decisions made by editors to political 
pressure whenever these decisions do 
not suit the journalists themselves. Also, 
they often read censorship into the very existence of information and editorial policy, and 
are suspicious about consent for interviews which is made dependent on authorisation. 
The journalist community’s serious anxiety about the situation is signified by the ‘Stop the 
Censorship’ journalists’ movement that appeared in 2010, although the cases presented 
are rarely unambiguous.
The situation of the media operating at the local level is much worse than for those on 
the national level. This is both because they are weaker in organisational and financial 
terms, and also because the arrogance of the authorities (state and self-government) at the 
local level is often much greater than in case of the national government. Moreover, much 
of these media is still owned by the local authorities. The situation in the local media se-
ems to be worsening, but this is hard to assess as the national media display little interest 
in the situation in provincial centres. The only instance that has received much publicity 
was the case of Vasyl Klymentyev, an investigative journalist from Kharkiv who went mis-
sing in August; it may reasonably be presumed that the local authorities and/or organised 
criminals were involved. There is no evidence as yet that Klymentyev has been kidnapped 
or murdered, but the investigation does seem to be being conducted sluggishly.
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 They were deprived of part of 
their frequencies, and not their 
licences to broadcast, as was 
mistakenly stated in the Euro-
pean People's Party resolution 
of 13 September 2010. 
The above-mentioned TV sta-
tions are broadcasting on 
the same frequencies as in 2009.
Most of the Ukrainian national media 
are sensitive to suggestions made by 
the government's representatives, as these 
media companies’ owners are big business-
men who operate in different branches 
of the economy; they therefore try to keep 
good relations with the political authorities. 
These owners are inclined to respect and 
even anticipate the government's sugge-
stions regarding media information policy.
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The opposition in crisis
The parliamentary opposition (which consists of Our Ukraine/ People’s Self-Defence and the 
Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc) remains deep in crisis. The opposition is apparently unable to reflect 
upon the reasons for its defeat and develop a program of further actions, including questions 
that should be raised as for the responsibility for the defeat. The esteem Victor Yushchenko 
once enjoyed is long gone, and Yulia Tymoshenko’s charisma has been tested by her time 
in power, which required her to take responsibility for the state. As a result it has grown much 
weaker, and it is not certain whether Tymoshenko will be able to lead her party to another 
electoral battle, especially if the local elections bring her further defeats7. The previous losses 
have already made some of the politicians from the aforementioned blocs, and especially the 
businessmen that had supported them, come over to the ruling team’s side.
Among the new political parties which raised many expectations in 2009, Strong Ukraine has 
become a satellite of the Party of Regions (as it quite possibly may have been from the start), 
and can therefore count on a decent result in the local elections, whereas Arseniy Yatseniuk’s 
Front for Change has remained on the political margins, and only gained good result in the 
western part of the country. Moreover, suspicions have been raised that the Front for Change is 
a part of the Party of Regions’ political strategy’, which is aimed at seizing a part of Tymoshen-
ko’s electorate; the behind-the-scenes relations between Yatseniuk and Firtash were noted back 
in 2009. Against this background, it is worth taking a closer look at the phenomenon of the 
chauvinistic Svoboda party whose popularity is steadily growing. There is little doubt that after 
the upcoming local elections it will be a major political force in the local councils in Eastern 
Galicia, and may also have serious chances of entering the parliament in 2012.
Local elections
The local elections scheduled for October will be a key stage in the process of the Party of Re-
gions’ reach for total power. The party is aiming to win majorities in the district and city councils, 
excluding perhaps districts in the Galicia region where a more nationalist electorate prevails. 
This objective cannot be considered blameworthy in itself. However, to this end, the ruling party 
has manipulated the electoral law, for example, by seriously amending the electoral system on 
the eve of the election campaign; the proportional representation system will be replaced by 
a mixed system (50% of deputies will be elected in single-member constituencies, and the re-
maining 50% in multi-member constituencies). At the same time, only political parties now have 
the right to put forward candidates in the elections (including the single-member constituencies 
and in the elections of city mayors). Local civil initiatives were excluded from these elections, 
as were persons running in their own name. This is meant to make the local self-government 
more party-oriented, and also to make the political system in the entire country more uniform.
Prospects for future developments of the political situation
The authority of the Party of Regions seems unchallenged, at least until the parliamentary 
elections in autumn 2012. The party’s victory in the upcoming local elections seems almost 
certain (apart from the western districts, which are not important from the party’s perspec-
tive). In the coming years Ukraine’s political life will be shaped by the competition among 
the factions within the Party of Regions. This competition may intensify, as new business 
conflicts are likely to break out, and the parties of the conflicts will certainly appeal to the 
president for arbitration. However, it should not be expected that these conflicts will result 
in the elimination of some of the main groups, although the configuration of the groups may 
alter significantly. Open splits in the party are even less likely.
 
 
 
 
 
7 According to the latest polls 
carried out by the Razumkov 
Centre in August 2010, 
in parliamentary elections 
the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc 
could obtain the support 
of 13.7% of voters (compared 
to 21.5% in September 2009), 
and the Party of Regions 
could get 27.6% (compared 
to 31.1% in 2009). Forecasts 
concerning the local elections 
are not available.
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The further centralisation of power can be expected in Ukraine, including restrictions put 
on local self-government, as this is a form of government that the Party of Regions elites 
are not favourably disposed towards. Many experts expect that after the local elections, 
autonomy for Crimea may be significantly (albeit informally) restricted, which will allow 
the businessmen associated with the Party of Regions to take over attractive assets (such 
as holiday resorts) from the local businesses.
In the media sphere, a further concentration of the electronic media can be expected, which 
will deepen their dependence over the political authority. Another probable trend will be the 
decreasing importance of the printed press, especially local newspapers, and a mass depar-
ture to the Internet of journalists who are critically disposed towards the government.
Pro-Western NGOs are likely to be intimidated as before, although in this case an appropria-
te reaction from the Western states could be very successful in curbing such endeavours.
Ukrainian society is plunged into apathy; 
the readiness to protest remains very low, 
and does not seem likely to grow. The rule 
of the parties and leaders who came to 
power in the winter of 2004 has brought 
great disillusionment. There seem to be 
no organised communities that could ini-
tiate a massive social protest (the ‘Orange 
Revolution’ was preceded by a gradually 
growing protest activity spanning almost 
4 years). Such a situation will lead to the 
Party of Regions ruling in comfort and un-
challenged, and will not prompt it to take 
public opinion into account.
The process by which power is being mo-
nopolised into the hands of the Party of 
Regions is likely to be completed by fur-
ther amendments to the constitution. In the coming weeks, it may be expected that the 
Constitutional Court will rule that the amendment to the constitution adopted in 2004, 
which restricted the president’s authority and granted more powers to the parliament, 
was adopted unlawfully (which is indeed true). The way this question is resolved will have 
a great impact on the future of Ukrainian democracy.
The possibility that anything should challenge the power of the Party of Regions before the 
parliamentary elections scheduled for 2012 seems very unlikely for the aforementioned 
reasons. The only factor that could bring about this scenario would be an economic break-
down on a scale that would cause social order to collapse. The Party of Regions’ electoral 
prospects in 2012 will heavily depend on developments in the economic sphere, as well 
as on the efficiency of the party’s attempts to block the formation of any influential opposi-
tion force that could enjoy popularity in both the eastern and central parts of the country.
In the coming years Ukraine's political life 
will be shaped by the competition among 
the factions within the Party of Regions. 
This competition may intensify, as new 
business conflicts are likely to break out, 
and the parties of the conflicts will certa-
inly appeal to the president for arbitration. 
However, it should not be expected that 
these conflicts will result in the elimination 
of some of the main groups, although 
the configuration of the groups may alter 
significantly. Open splits in the party 
are even less likely.
